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Certain
Tax Issues Concerning Employee Termination Fees
By Mark
A. Segal
JULY 2007 - Tax
law imposes significant financial and administrative duties on employers
with respect to payroll taxes. Critical to such duties is the payment
of wages. According to IRC sections 3121 and 3401, wages are generally
understood to encompass “all remuneration, for employment,
including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits)
paid in any medium other than cash.” The
expression “employment” is defined broadly as “any
service, of whatever nature, performed by an employee for the person
employing him.” In recent years, controversy has emerged concerning
the tax treatment of amounts paid in the termination of services.
If the amounts are determined to be wages, the payments will trigger
withholding-tax obligations (at both the state and federal level)
and employer matching payments for certain taxes (i.e., FICA and
FUTA) paid out of the employee’s paycheck. Typically, if instead
the amounts paid are considered income to the recipient but not
wages, the employer will be relieved of withholding (administration)
and matching duties. Proper
classification of such payments is crucial, because failure to
properly treat such amounts can result in the payer being subject
to significant penalties and interest. Taxpayers often pay the
taxes even when they believe they are not responsible for them,
and then sue for a refund. Whether these duties are applicable
and have been appropriately carried out hinges upon a determination
of the relationship between the worker and the party for whom
the work was performed, and the basis for the recipient having
been paid. Recently, payroll tax disputes have centered on the
classification of certain payments associated with termination
or severance from service, and for tenure rights.
Definition
of Wages
Courts have
tended to find payments associated with the termination of services
to constitute wages. As wages, such amounts would typically be
subject to payroll tax obligations. In many instances, however,
such taxes have been imposed on amounts received for other than
what one would consider to be services. For example, in Social
Security Board v. Nierotko (327 US 358), back pay for a worker
who had been wrongfully separated from his job and did no actual
work during the period was found subject to payroll taxes. Other
cases citing Nierotko have found FICA and FUTA taxes
applicable to unlawful termination payments for past and future
earnings, and when the employer entered into a termination settlement
to avoid paying retirement benefits. [See Grebec, 164
F.3d 1015 (6th Circuit), and Mayberry, 151 F.3d 855.]
Not all payments made to a worker in connection with employment
have been found to constitute wages. For example, certain meal
reimbursements or qualified allowance arrangements will be considered
neither wages nor subject to FICA or FUTA. (See Central Illinois
Public Service Company, 55 L. Ed 2d 82, and Royster Company,
479 F.2d 387.)
Cases
Involving Tenure
In recent
years, litigation has involved cases where an educational institution
or system pays a teacher for retirement or for the surrender of
tenure rights. Historically, the IRS has successfully challenged
what is considered to be severance pay as the payment of wages
subject to FICA and FUTA taxes. Cases involving the termination
of educational employees or other workers who possess what are
considered tenure rights have met with more uncertain results.
Such cases include North Dakota State University, University
of Pittsburgh, and Appoloni.
In University
of Pittsburgh, the University of Pittsburgh paid amounts
to certain tenured faculty to buy out their tenure rights so they
would retire early. From 1996 to 2001, the university paid out
more than $2 million in such buyouts. The university submitted
FICA taxes with regard to the buyout payments and then sued for
a refund on grounds that the amounts had been paid for surrender
of tenure rights. The IRS rejected the claim, so the university
brought a lawsuit in federal district court. The IRS contended
that the payments were made for seniority rights. Following the
precedent of North Dakota State University [255 F.3d
599 (8th Cir. 2001)] and Revenue Ruling 58-301, 1958-1 C.B. 301,
the court held that payments for the surrender of tenure rights
do not constitute wages.
In North
Dakota State University, the Eighth Circuit held that amounts
paid for relinquishment of tenure rights were not subject to FICA
where the tenure rights were based upon factors other than length
of service. These factors included scholarship, teaching, research,
and contributions to society. As expressed by the court, “The
decision to award tenure rests on criteria that reflect the potential
long term contribution of the faculty member to the purposes,
priorities, and resources of the institution, unit and program.”
The existence of tenure at North Dakota State served as recognition
of contributions that had been made to the academic world or to
one’s discipline or profession, as well as a protection
of academic freedom. Tenure was considered more of a protected
right.
In light
of the role of tenure as expressed in North Dakota State University,
significant differences were found to exist between tenure rights
and seniority rights:
- Tenure
is awarded to allow intellectual and academic freedom of inquiry
and expression.
- Tenure
is not dependent upon length of service alone.
- Tenure
is a discretionary determination based on certain subjective
criteria.
- Tenure
is a property right that is not transferable, and as such, the
receipt of tenure, by itself, cannot be viewed as triggering
income recognition.
- Tenure
is not amenable to being treated as restricted compensation.
- Tenure
provides certain protected rights and the ability—absent
certain just cause and adherence to certain procedural protections—the
right to retain one’s position absent cause or financial
exigency.
In Nierotko,
the IRS indicated that not all payments flowing from an employer
to an employee were within the ambit of wages despite finding
that amounts paid as back pay represented compensation for services
amenable to FICA.
In Revenue
Ruling 58-301, 1958-1 C.B. 23, the IRS indicated that payments
made in retirement of a contractually guaranteed right of employment
did not constitute wages. The amount was paid for the cancellation
of the balance of a five-year employment contract. It was considered
to be ordinary income and not capital gain, as it was not in return
for a capital asset. Although includible in gross income, the
amounts were not subject to FICA or federal income tax withholding.
In contrast to Revenue Ruling 58-301, Revenue Ruling 75-44, 1975-1
C.B. 15 held that amounts paid as consideration for “the
employee agreeing to perform a different type of work and refrain
from asserting employment rights acquired as a result of past
services rendered pursuant to contract were wages, and as such
subject to federal income tax withholding.” Revenue Ruling
75-44 has been distinguished from Revenue Ruling 58-301 in that
58-301 involved payment primarily for “cancellation of the
employee’s original contract rights rather than primarily
in consideration of the past performance of services through which
the relinquished employment rights were acquired.”
In the recent
case of Appoloni, Sr., et al. v. United States [No. 04-2068,
05-0149 (6th Circuit, June 7, 2006)], the Sixth Circuit adopted
an expansive view of when amounts paid to teachers for the surrender
of tenure rights constituted wages under IRC section 3121. The
case concerned school districts that made payments to teachers
who had received what was called tenure, based largely on having
worked a certain number of years. As expressed by the court: “Classification
of the payment and its tax treatment are determined not merely
upon the label used for the right, but how the right was acquired.”
The payments were largely due to the number of years worked and
couldn’t be viewed as solely a tenure right, but rather
for early retirement. In the court’s opinion, these payments
did not vary from the type of payments classified in severance
package cases. The court looked favorably on the IRS’s citation
of Revenue Ruling 75-44 and took an expansive view of wages. The
court noted that the motive for purchase of the rights was the
same as in cases where individuals were paid to surrender employment
rights, which had been held to be wages. In Appoloni,
it was noted that the purchase of purported tenure rights was
necessary to terminate the worker’s services.
The court
left open the possibility that had the facts of the case been
different, a different outcome might have been reached. In this
regard, the decision was reached because the facts supported a
finding that the payments made were based upon longevity (number
of years of service) rather than on tenure rights, which take
more fully into account different variables and provide protection
for expression and inquiry (e.g., in North Dakota State University).
Noteworthy
Revenue Rulings
There are
several revenue rulings concerning the tax treatment of amounts
received for cancellation of contract rights. Among the most recent
is Revenue Ruling 2004-110, 2004-2 C.B. 960. This ruling addresses
a scenario where an employee and employer had entered into a written
employment agreement that lacked a provision concerning the possibility
of payments if the contract were canceled by mutual agreement
prior to the end of the contract period. In this case, after several
years the contract was terminated by mutual agreement and the
employer agreed to pay the employee an amount for cancellation
of the employee’s contract rights. In its analysis, the
IRS reviewed other relevant rulings and indicated that it was
modifying the position it had taken in such rulings. The IRS noted
that the term “wages” is broadly defined for FICA
and FUTA purposes. The IRS noted that the code and regulations
consider any payment made by an employer to an employee to be
remuneration absent a specific exception to the contrary. The
label given to this payment is irrelevant. In addition, the payment
will still be considered to be remuneration even though no employer-employee
relationship existed at the time of the payment. Citing
IRC sections 3121(b) and 3306(c), and Regulations sections 331.3121(b)-3(b)
and 31.3306(c)-2(b), the IRS noted: “Employment encompasses
the establishment, maintenance, furtherance, alteration, or cancellation
of the employer-employee relationship or any of the terms and
conditions thereof. If the employee provides clear, separate,
and adequate consideration of the employer’s payment that
is not dependent upon the employer-employee relationship and its
component terms and conditions, the payment is not wages for purposes
of FICA, FUTA, or Federal income tax withholding.”
Based upon
this fact pattern, where the employee receives the payment as
consideration for the cancellation of the contract, the payment
would be treated as remuneration unless there is clear evidence
to the contrary. The IRS in turn stated that Revenue Rulings 55-520
and 58-301 each failed in their analyses and that the payments
in those situations should have been classified as wages.
Revenue Ruling
55-520, 1955-2 C.B. 393 had found that an amount received by a
worker as compromise for a claim based upon cancellation of an
employment contract, although constituting income, was not wages
for FICA or FUTA purposes. Likewise, Revenue Ruling 58-301, 1958-1
C.B. 23 concluded that a lump sum received by an employee for
cancellation of the balance of an employment contract was includible
in income but was not considered wages for FICA or FUTA purposes.
According to the ruling, the amount paid was deemed to have been
paid for relinquishment of contract rights.
In contrast,
Revenue Ruling 74-252, 1974-1 C.B. 287 found that an amount paid
to an employee for involuntary termination of a contract was wages
and subject to FICA and FUTA taxes. According to the terms of
the agreement, the payments were different than those in Revenue
Ruling 58-301—they were considered dismissal payments under
the terms of the contract rather than consideration for the relinquishment
of rights under the contract. Relevant to the finding was that
the contract allowed the employer to terminate the contract at
any time, so long as the employee was paid an amount equal to
an additional six months’ salary. Likewise, Revenue Ruling
75-44, 1975-1 C.B. 15 involved payments made in consideration
of the employee doing a different type of work without raising
issues concerning rights that might have been provided under a
prior employment contract. The payments were found to be subject
to FICA and FUTA taxes. The ruling states that it modifies and
supersedes Revenue Rulings 55-520 and 58-301.
CSX
Certain courts
have held that supplemental unemployment compensation benefits
meeting the criteria of IRC section 3402(o) are not subject to
employment taxes. For example, in the recent case of CSX Corporation,
et al. v. United States [No. 95-0858T, U.S. Ct. of Federal
Cl.s (2006)], the Court of Federal Claims examined whether certain
payments made to employees as part of a plan to reduce CSX’s
workforce were subject to employment taxes pursuant to section
3402(o).
Previously
the court had ruled that “lump sum amounts given in exchange
for an employee’s agreement to terminate his or her relationship
with the company and to relinquish all rights and benefits associated
with that relationship” would be considered supplemental
unemployment compensation benefits when elected by an employee
then in layoff status. In contrast, where the election to separate
is made by employees in lieu of their existing positions or in
lieu of standby, the amount will not qualify as supplemental unemployment
compensation. In CSX, the court addressed the following two issues:
- Whether
payments made to a furloughed employee who declines to transfer
and elects to accept a separation allowance rather than remain
in layoff status (without benefits) can be considered paid to
the employee due to involuntary separation from service.
- Whether
documentation provided by the plaintiffs established that they
were on furlough status at the time they elected to separate
and thus not subject to employment tax.
With regard
to the first issue, the court found that an employee who has been
laid off “declines the opportunity to resume his or her
employment (albeit at another location) and who instead elects
to separate in lieu of relinquishing all layoff benefits cannot
be said to have been involuntarily separated.” The court
ruled that the payment does not avoid employment taxes pursuant
to IRC section 3402(o). With respect to the second issue, the
court found that interoffice documentation, including a memorandum
from the senior vice-president of transportation and accounting
with the personal data in handwritten notes, could be considered
proof that certain individuals were on furlough at the time of
their separation.
Be
Aware of the IRS’s Stance
Whether payments
made to past or present workers are subject to employment taxes
can make a significant financial difference. Recent cases such
as University of Pittsburgh, Appoloni, and CSX
provide insight into the issues that arise in the classification
of payments associated with termination of service. In light of
the IRS’s expansive view of what constitutes wages, taxpayers
must be wary of how amounts paid associated with wages are classified
for tax purposes. Nevertheless, by being aware of relevant statutes,
cases, and IRS pronouncements, advisors can better help individuals
achieve desired results.
Mark
A. Segal, CPA, JD, LLM, is a professor of accounting at
the Mitchell College of Business at the University of South Alabama,
Mobile, Ala.
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