| The
Rhetoric of Belief
MARCH
2005 - One of several fundamental changes that FASB will work
on during the coming year will be the movement of the GAAP
hierarchy and of the authority for GAAP to FASB’s own
standards. Currently, the GAAP hierarchy is in auditing standards
and the GAAP authority resides in voluntary associations’
codes of conduct. The board will likely specify two levels
of GAAP—authoritative and all other—and make it
clear that following GAAP is the responsibility of the preparer,
not just of the auditor or the member of a voluntary association.
The other fundamental change will be a reconsideration of
the FASB conceptual framework, which would become part of
authoritative GAAP. Choosing
Words Carefully
One
of my deepest concerns about these two projects entails
the pervasive practice by FASB’s constituencies of
expressing their comments in terms of “beliefs.”
It’s virtually impossible to read a comment letter
to the board, or to any other accounting authority, without
reading: “We believe that …” Likewise,
it’s common to hear such assertions as, “I believe
we did that yesterday,” when the speaker means simply,
“I recall we did that yesterday.” Because language
choice so often both reflects and influences what we mean
substantively, there are inherent pitfalls in characterizing
assertions, whether about opinions, values, logical inferences,
or knowledge, in terms of beliefs. Especially in this post-modern
world, where one person’s beliefs are no better than
another’s—just different—presenting important
dialectics in terms of “beliefs” inevitably
invites solutions unrelated to discipline-specific rational
discourse. Consider, for example, the creation of accounting
principles by people relatively unfamiliar with accounting—because,
after all, they’re just a matter of belief.
Often,
people mistakenly resort to expressing their lack of certainty
about something by saying, “I believe ....”
Sometimes such expressions reflect an unsophisticated knowledge
of language, but they can also occur while speaking, when
body language, expressions, and intonation can clarify that
“belief” refers to an uncertainty rather than
to a belief. This hierarchy of uncertainty is often expressed
in descending order from “I know” to “I
believe” to “I think” to “I feel.”
On the other hand, the cues inherent in oral expression
do not exist in written discourse, where much more care
must be given to word choice.
A problem
arises when “know,” “believe,” “think,”
and “feel” are consistently used relationally:
any sense of the substantive differences between knowledge,
beliefs, thoughts, and feelings is lost. Likewise, when
logical inferences, expressions of ideals, or recollections
of past events are expressed in terms of beliefs, others
will inevitably begin treating all as beliefs, frequently
resulting in action predicated on the most fervently held
belief even when wrong.
Generally,
to say “I believe …” indicates that the
empirical (external) or logical (internal) evidence for
an assertion is incomplete, but your circumstances require
immediate action. That action may simply be agreeing or
disagreeing with an outlandish proposition, or it could
concern something more serious. Whatever the circumstances,
the essence of belief is accepting either unconditionally
or provisionally an assertion supported by inconclusive
evidence. Sometimes, people finesse such situations by appealing
to authority. They embrace a belief because a trusted authority
supports it: “I have no firsthand knowledge of someone’s
action, but I am willing to accept that you saw it, and
I will take action based on your testimony.” People
will often embrace religious beliefs or moral positions
on the credible testimony of an authority.
While
I am willing to accept assertions of belief in both written
and oral communication when used rhetorically as an exhortation,
such usages rest less easy with me when used in rational
discourse. In such cases, the author is usually trying to
inspire us to some idea. On the other hand, how do you interpret
an assertion such as, “We believe that accounting
for (you name it) should be done (you specify it)”?
Is the writer a narcissistic egomaniac trying to assert
his will like an absolute monarch? Is the writer simply
uncertain about his assertion? Does the writer possess some
evidence to support the assertion, but not enough to draw
either an empirical or a logical conclusion? Is the writer
simply confused?
Choosing
Intelligent Discourse
The
rhetoric of belief does not usually result in satisfying
or long-term solutions to problems, because the resulting
polarization leads everyone to look for immediate compromises
in their own self-interest. We’ve all been in the
situation where someone says, “I believe X,”
and you say, “That’s nice; I believe Y.”
It’s hard to have discourse about beliefs. You either
accept or reject them. It’s also hard to achieve consensus,
because some parties will be in the position of denying
their beliefs.
Since 1900, accountancy has revisited its conceptual foundation
about once every 35 years. We’re in that process again,
and what takes place in the next few years to modify FASB’s
conceptual framework and to converge it with the IASB’s
will affect accountancy until mid-century.
The
last time we went through this process it was immensely
contentious, riddled with numerous unsatisfying negotiated
compromises, and replete with assertions whose purpose was
to provide future justification for existing positions,
partially because of the rhetoric of belief. This time,
let’s make every attempt to leave the rhetoric of
belief behind and to engage in intelligent discourse on
this very important topic.
Robert
H. Colson, PhD, CPA
Editor-in-Chief
rhcolson@nysscpa.org
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